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**TRANSFORMATION OF THE HUNGARIAN HOME DEFENSE  
FORCES OR A NEW ROLE IN A NEW ENVIRONMENT**

**BY**

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL ISTVAN BEKESI**

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**TRANSFORMATION OF THE HUNGARIAN HOME DEFENSE FORCES  
FOR A NEW ROLE  
IN A NEW ENVIRONMENT.**

by

LTC Istvan Bekesi

Infantry

David C. Bennett

Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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## **ABSTRACT**

**AUTHOR:** LTC Istvan Bekesi

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Research will include the historical experiences of other armed forces about this kind of transformation (from a drafted armed force to a professional one, from a mass army to a smaller, but more effective one). Discussion of suggested land component of Armed Forces, their mission, influence of NATO membership, and way of restructuring will set the stage for discussion of a Hungarian "Highly Lethal Mobile Forces (HLMF)" under the concept of Hungary's Light Force Option (Force 2015) by the RAND CORPORATION.



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## **PREFACE**

The change of the international political system which took place in 1989-90, and the fundamental social, political and economic transformations, put an end to the artificial and forced separation which for four and half decades had been keeping Hungary out of the mainstream of European development. The obstacle in the way of Hungary to take its place among the democratic states of Europe and the world had been removed.

A consensus emerged among the political parties in the Hungarian National Assembly constituted in 1990 - irrespective of whether they were in the Government or in opposition - on a desired future of Hungary. The country may become a modern European nation in the quickest possible way, with the least sacrifice, and develop an economy, social and political structures based on solid grounds by becoming part of the European cooperative institutions, for example the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Hungary became a member of NATO on March 12, 1999. It was, it is, and it will be a long process, full of a number of difficulties, in which the former Hungarian People's Army - as part of Hungarian society - was reformed, is being transformed, and

will be turned into a more modern, and effective, even and more NATO compatible army.

Sometimes we do not know the goal, which we would like to reach at the end of this long process, and even more do not know the way providing us to this desired future. To settle the structure, the system of training, and readiness of this new Armed Forces, to identify the resources for these changes, to offer some proposals about the way of becoming the new Hungarian Home Defense Forces (HHDF) is very difficult and complex task.

It is important for me, as a Hungarian military officer, to know the aims, and the reasons for these changes, the requirements which have to be met by HHDF at the end of each period, and all of transformation, the tasks which must be accomplished, and carried out during this process by HHDF.

In my research paper, I have tried to discover a possible structure of HHDF, to investigate some aspect of this transformation in order to be able to defend the Homeland, and to meet the requirements of NATO membership.

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# **TRANSFORMATION OF THE HUNGARIAN HOME DEFENSE FORCES FOR A NEW ROLE IN A NEW ENVIRONMENT.**

## **NEW ROLE AND NEW ENVIRONMENT**

The former Hungarian People's Army, as a member of the Warsaw Treaty coalition, was an armed force guided, controlled and operated by the Hungarian Social Worker's Party. It was a relatively large, expensive, and underdeveloped, and it had different internal, external and international functions.

Its main internal function, beside educating young generations, and helping the Hungarian economy when necessary, was to participate in the maintenance the socialist political system, and to keep order inside the country in case of any riot or discontent. This function had to be accomplished in cooperation with the internal armed forces and the police, later only with the police against any "inside enemy", for example, members of the former bourgeoisie and liberal intelligentsia.

The external mission, the less likely one, was to defend Hungary's independence and sovereignty in case of military aggression from outside the country.

And finally the international function of Hungarian People Army was to be prepared to contribute and to participate to the

common defense of European socialist countries against any outside or inside military or other type of threat.

After the first free parliamentary elections in 1990, the new Hungarian government faced a number of tasks, which must be accomplished in order to transform Hungary to a modern European democratic society. At that time one of the most important questions was, and in my opinion still is, how to transform the former Hungarian People's Army to a new one, which will be able to meet the requirements of new political, economical, and military environment.

During this long lasting process the HHDF faced and is facing different and often changeable tasks and functions, depending on the political circumstances and status of the country.

The biggest external function change can be seen when Hungary became a member of the NATO political and military structure. While Hungary was "independent" in terms of not belonging to any political or military organization and had no allies, the external function of HHDF was to offer credible deterrence when faced with outside, armed aggression, which has to include the prevention and - if, need be - the waging of war.

This external function must be dramatically changed after joining Hungary the NATO. According to earlier mentioned inter-

national political changes the tasks facing the HHDF are the following:

**INTERNAL FUNCTION:** the HHDF underpin constitutionality, the rule of law and the incumbent social system within the given framework. As needed, it may assist in maintaining public administration, order and in assisting in case of natural disaster and catastrophes endangering the public, and in alleviating the consequences of such disasters.

**EXTERNAL FUNCTION:** the HHDF must be prepared to defend the homeland in cooperation with the allied forces in case of outside aggression.

**INTERNATIONAL FUNCTION:** the HHDF must participate in carrying out international obligations undertaken by the state. The HHDF must be able to deploy armed forces to defend other allied nations in case of external aggression against anyone of them.

It also must be ready to help in the execution of peace support, humanitarian assistance missions under the auspices of the United Nations, or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, led by NATO or the Western European Union.

What are the requirements that must be met at the end of this transformation of Armed Forces? First of all there must be established a democratic - through the Parliament and government

- command and control system over the Ministry of Defense and HHDF.

The Hungarian National Assembly must provide a clear civilian control over the military affairs of the country. As earlier as it possible must be clarify lines of authority between the president and government, prime minister and civilian defense minister, both in peace time and in wartime.

Hungarian legislative authorities have to adjust structure, missions and functions of the HHDF to the new political status of the country.

The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff have to reorganize and restructure the training of troops, education of officers and non-commissioned officers, as well as work out and establish a new, more effective training system in order to meet the requirements of a new democratic society on the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

And last, but not least, Hungarian political and military leaders have to transform and prepare the HHDF to meet the requirements of NATO membership, helping the settlement Hungary among European nations. These are the main requirements and factors influencing the process of transformation of HHDF during the democratization our country.

## **FACILITATORS**

For a future structure of the armed forces, the HHDF has the recommendations of the RAND CORPORATION, describing major factors, requirements, and conditions of the 21<sup>st</sup> century army. Certain internal factors will help Hungary achieve the HMLF structure within a reasonable time frame (10-15 years).

There is a strong willingness on the part of the government and political parties to transform not only Hungarian society, but also all military machinery of Hungary. At the same time there is a deep understanding of the necessity for transformation, as well as a high level of enthusiasm and commitment of the military personnel to quickly meet NATO requirement and HLMF standards.

Hungary has a well-organized and developed education system, and as a result of this a well-educated citizenry, which will help quickly to meet the requirement of high-tech weaponry, equipment and interoperability. It also makes it easier to transform military personnel, increase the level of expectations to the future military, and to enhance the reputation of the HHDF.

The HHDF's current inventory of equipment and its condition will adequately fill out a needed interim force, allowing the Hungarian Government to not overburden the economy of the country with extended military budgets.

There is a whole spectrum of favorable external conditions - political, economic, educational, and military - as well as help and support from the new allied countries, their citizens as well as militaries, which will speed up the process of transformation of Hungary.

### **POTENTIAL EXTERNAL THREATS**


In the cold war era, the Hungarian People's Army had to be ready to a "worldwide collision", which required maintenance of large, mass armed forces in order to be prepared to the "final, decisive combat". It had to have significant amount of rapidly deployable and employable units near to western borders and at the same time a sizable number of reserve component units in the Eastern part of the country, deployable after 15-30 days.

The execution of that doctrine required big numbers of trained and especially disciplined personnel and units, which were not necessary the best equipped, because the idea was that the victory could be gained by outnumbering the opposing party. In compliance with the doctrine, the Hungarian People's Army had a large numbers of reserve units, as well as all wartime command and control structure, which was hardly deployable and effective in a low or moderate intensity conflict.

After the disintegration of the Warsaw Treaty, Hungary and its armed forces faced a new situation, when the political and military leadership of the country had to reconsider the Hungarian National Security Strategy, as well as the armed forces structure. In this new situation Hungary became an independent country, encircled by changing and ambiguous new nations and the HHDF had to be prepared to defend the country without outside help.

The situation dramatically changed when Hungary joined NATO, because it becomes a part of a political and military alliance, which has big influence to the formulation of National Security Strategies and the HHDF's structure and function.

The following chart shows the change of the HHDF's personnel strength during Hungary's transformation to a new democratic country.



**TABLE 1: HHDF'S PERSONNEL STRENGTH 1989-1998**

In these changing conditions and circumstances, and in order to adjust the structure and missions of the HHDF to the requirements of the new environment, the type and level of threat against which these Armed Forces have to defend the country, must be measured, and settled.

As we can see in today's situation in the region, Hungary and the HHDF can meet, or face the local low-, and mid-intensity threats, and a more unlikely large power threat by one of our bigger neighbor.

The low-intensity threats can be a border incursion by a neighbor country's Armed Forces, or airspace violations, or influx of refugees fleeing from conflict in a neighboring state. These kinds of crises require detection, identification and challenge by border guard, following by rapid reinforcement by well-armed mobile units.

In order to meet the requirements of the low-intensity threats the HHDF have to have some middle sized - company or battalion - rapidly deployable, highly mobile, capable of independently carrying out military operations or military operations other than war during a short time period - 3-5 days.

These forces must be based on the most likely axis of border incursions. They must have well trained personnel, modern equipment ensuring safe activity of soldiers in the battlefield and

effective combat activity against well-equipped military or paramilitary formations. Because of the character of the threat these units must have high level of readiness and communication capability.

During a moderate-intensity threat, which is unlikely, a neighboring state of similar size engages in open conflict with Hungary. In these circumstances the HHDF must provide a rapid response by mobile land forces for initial defense, then deployment of all other active units, following by preparation for Allied reinforcements.

On the one hand to meet the requirements of this kind of threat the HHDF must have fast deployable units, which are able to give an effective early respond to an enemy attack, to hold their position and to be ready support allied forces.

On the other hand Hungary has to have the required infrastructure and systems of communication in order to ensure arriving NATO forces necessary combat and service conditions.

In case of any large-power threats, overwhelming capability of the HHDF, it must be prepared to deny the enemy rapid penetration by a rapidly deployable, mobile force with advanced anti-armor capability. The same time the HHDF must be ready - as a member of defense alliance - to support arriving allied reinforcement by necessary infrastructure and plans.

## **DESIRED ARMED FORCES STRUCTURE (2010 - 2015)**

Advances in technology and doctrine over the past two decades have made a robust light defensive force possible and affordable. A force organized around air-mobile light infantry, and armed with modern man-portable precision weaponry, is both powerful and versatile.


Considering Hungary's security environment, its NATO obligations, and budget constraints, a highly lethal mobile force (HLMF) is a very attractive option. Hungary cannot afford a heavy force structure that matches up well against possible regional threats. Armor and mechanized forces, which would be needed to defeat these threats, while also meeting NATO standards, are very expensive to obtain, operate and maintain.

Low-intensity border incursions and mid-intensity confrontations with regional threats can be dealt with effectively with HLMF. At the same time the HLMF-based HHDF could also sufficiently delay invasion by a large power, until NATO reinforcements arrived.

Such a force structure is also appropriate, with few modifications, for participation in NATO contingencies and international peacekeeping operations.

## THE HIGHLY LETHAL MOBILE FORCE

The HLMF is a definition, describing a next century Armed Forces, which is equipped with the newest technology of weaponry and transportation, including efficient command and control elements, fire-and-forget weapon systems, and significant amount of combat and transport helicopters as well as ground transportation. There must be well trained, professional, units in high state of readiness in order to defeat an outnumbering, armored aggressor as well as conduct different military operations other than war.



**TABLE 2:** ORGANIZATION OF HUNGARIAN LAND FORCES WITH HLMF

The HHDF can best take advantage of HLMF concept by structuring its land forces as a corps. All maneuver units are would be brigades, directly subordinated to the corps. Most of the combat support and combat service support units would be directly subordinate to the corps.

"Maneuver units would consist of two HLMF air-mobile infantry brigades, one heavy (armor/mechanized) brigade, one artillery brigade, one cavalry (reconnaissance) squadron, and one light infantry battalion dedicated to multinational formations."

Support units would consist of signal, engineer, air defense, intelligence, transportation, supply and medical battalions and one heavy transport helicopter company.

In the interest of pooling resources at corps echelon, attack and transport helicopters could alternately be organized into an aviation brigade. A more expensive option, this proposal puts most helicopter assets under the command of the infantry brigade commanders.

Many large armies keep most combat support and combat service support in their large maneuver units, such as divisions. However, the size of the future HHDF suggests that it would be best to keep support units at corps echelon, attaching them to maneuver units only when needed for training or deployment, in

task-organized fashion. Putting combat support and combat service support units under direct Land Forces or corps command and control has several advantages for the HHDF, providing:

- more flexibility in distributing scarce support and service assets to the combat units that need them most, but only when they need them;

- a better hierarchy for training of combat support and combat service support personnel and units;

- enhanced career path for support branch officers;

- tiered readiness;

- a leaner, more responsive force;


- budget savings.

### **THE HLMF BRIGADE**

As a basic element of new HHDF's land component the HLMF brigade is a dynamic, flexible force that can cover 100 km of front, executing a whole spectrum of military operations and military operations other than war activities as necessary anywhere in Hungary. At the same time it must be interoperable with the armed forces of other NATO members, and must be rapidly deployable to their territory.

It is primarily composed of well-armed, light, air-mobile infantry that depends on helicopters and wheeled vehicles to

achieve high level of mobility and fast maneuver. The HLMF brigade's probable organization is represented in table 3 below.



**TABLE 3:** ORGANIZATION OF THE HLMF BRIGADE

Its infantry battalions are armed with advanced anti-tank guided missiles capable of destroying enemy armor at distances of up to four kilometers. Attack helicopters in cooperation with ground elements of battalions would provide fire into the depths of opposing forces, impeding their advance. Transport helicopters would provide enough lift capacity to be able to move at least one infantry battalion at a time.

The brigade would have no organic artillery, instead depending on portable 120-mm mortars with "smart" munitions for close precision indirect fire support, while calling on corps echelon units for long-range artillery and MLRS fire.

"Each HLMF brigade can be based on 2 or 3 light infantry battalions, an attack helicopter battalion and a transport helicopter battalion. The attack helicopter battalion consists of 3 attack helicopter companies and 1 scout helicopter company. The transport helicopter battalion consists of 3 companies, each company having up to 20 utility helicopters (precise numbers depend on the specific helicopter platform used)."<sup>2</sup>

Organic support units would consist of a maintenance and support company and perhaps an engineer company. As mentioned earlier, corps would provide all other support echelon units in a task-organized fashion. Attack and transport helicopters could be pooled at corps echelon in an aviation brigade to achieve greater cost savings and flexibility.

Composed of well-armed and highly trained air-mobile infantry, the HLMF can defeat a numerically superior, armored opposing force, and sufficiently delay a large power. The lethality and precision of indirect-fire and other light anti-tank munitions have increased tremendously in recent years.

#### **NEW TECHNOLOGY AND WEAPONS**

New technologies have dramatically improved reconnaissance, information processing and guidance systems, permitting the development of more efficient command and control elements, fire-

and-forget weapons, and indirect-fire weaponry that takes advantage of the hunter/standoff killer concept. Man-portable weaponry, "smart" artillery and rocketry unmanned remote sensors and advanced attack helicopters have made the HLMF possible.

Both direct-fire and indirect-fire weapons have seen substantial advances. "Anti-tank weapon systems such as the Javelin and Eryx man-portable missiles, tube-launched optically tracked wire-guided (TOW) missiles, the enhanced fiber optic guided missile (EFOG-M), and the Apache-launched Hellfire missile are proven to be able to defeat present and future armor threats.

Indirect-fire weapons have also benefited considerably from modern technology. For example, the 120 mm Strix mortar and "smart" systems for the 105 mm and 155 mm howitzer artillery platforms have brought great increases in target destruction efficiency, with munitions that "hunt" for target."<sup>3</sup>

### **TRANSFORMATION TO THE NEW HHDF**

The challenge of creating this kind of effective force will be in its organization, operational doctrine, training and tactical employment. To fully take advantage of the HMLF, these high-tech weapon and delivery systems must be utilized in well-coordinated moves, and this has several implications for HHDF.

The Hungarian Government and the HHDF will have to:


- invest considerably in new weapons and equipment;
- dramatically change doctrine to address need for a highly-mobile combined arms capability;
- possess a highly-trained, professional force;
- train for high-quality leaders at lower echelons of command;
- build a non-commissioned officer corps from the ground up.

These are the main areas where the HHDF have to focus their attention; these are the conditions in which Hungarian military leadership has to work, to prepare the armed forces to be ready to defend Hungary against any threat.


There are some other circumstances and conditions influencing the possible way of the HHDF's transformation. For example the requirement of continuous readiness of homeland defense with the existing force structure. Permanent readiness, and alertness to improve the legal and institutional framework for the democratic, civil control of the armed forces.

An important part of the democratization of the armed forces is the strong and persistent desire of the leadership and personnel to establish and maintain unbroken and ever-present control of the day-to-day activity of military units, as well as to make the military budget visible and accountable.

The current economic situation makes it more important because of the severe financing condition and budgeting tendency of the HHDF. The following charts show the amount of money spent on the armed forces and its real value concerning annual inflation rate in the country as well as the relation between GDP and annual budget of Ministry of Defense.



**TABLE 4: MILITARY BUDGET OF HUNGARY 1991-98 (BILLION FT.)**



**TABLE 5: MILITARY BUDGET PERCENTAGE OF GDP 1993-98 (%)**

These facts also emphasize the importance of establishment and continued maintenance of a well-organized, accountable as well as easy to survey and control planning, programming and budgeting system of the HHDF.

Preparedness and readiness of meeting the requirements (troop readiness, language training and capability, C3, interoperability) of NATO membership is also one of the most important factor, allowing the HHDF to reach the ideal of a modern, effective, efficient, armed force supported by civil society.


### **MILITARY HIGHER EDUCATION**

In the future, military institutions of higher education would function outside the basic force structure as universities and colleges complying with the provisions of the Law on Higher Education. The Ministry of Defense will exercise professional guidance and legal supervision.

Officer training and education can be carried out mainly at Miklos Zrinyi National Defense University (MZNDU) and at the services' Military Colleges. Nevertheless the HHDF can not be averse to receive young applicants from civilian educational institutions.

Facing these new requirements, and an often changing financial situation, the institutions of military education must accomplish several changes in structure, relationships to each other, and personnel of their faculties.

These changes must be made towards decreasing the number of teaching subject, increasing the quality and specialization of education, cutting their personnel and budget. As opposed to the current situation, the institutions of higher military education must be separated from each other. They may be more effective, flexible, easier and cheaper to operate.



**TABLE 6:** ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY HIGHER EDUCATION

At the same time, the curriculum of university and colleges must be renewed in order to adjust to the new circumstances and requirements, to increase their effectiveness and reputation,

and in order to educate and establish a new type of military leadership from the lowest to the highest level.

Concerning these activities, the HHDF have to take full advantage of different military changing programs, fully take part in common NATO forces activities at every level. The Hungarian military educational institutions must be prepared to exchange their experiences with the institutions of the new allied countries, and adopt and apply them during their educational process.

The leadership of the HHDF has to pay special attention to the formation and preparation of a qualified non-commissioned officers' corps in order to establish conditions to reorganize and restructure the training system; to renew the training mentality; and to develop a new process to designate officers and NCOs. A very important aspect of this process is the preservation of the necessary non-commissioned officer's corps inside the HHDF.

In order to reach this goal, the Ministry of Defense and General Staff have to transform and improve the system of education of the NCOs. I think close attention must be concentrated on the practical side of preparation, and on the specialization of young applicants. This means that the education institute

does not have to be involved into the general education of a future NCO corps.

On the one hand to be able to do this, the HHDF have to change the system of selection. The NCO education organizations have to refuse to accept as a future student person not having graduated from high school. On the other hand to reach the necessary number of applicants, the Hungarian Government and HHDF leadership have to do all that is affordable in order to improve living conditions of the NCOs. The political and military leadership can keep the necessary and desired NCO corps on board, if they would be able offer them a stable future and career, and would do everything possible to make them interested in staying in the armed forces.

There must be the same requirement concerning other HHDF personnel because without a stable force of officers, NCOs and contracted or later volunteers eager to fight, work and if necessary die for the country the nation cannot meet any requirements of the modern, respond-capable, democratically controlled armed forces.

Personnel policies of the HHDF must be changed. The HHDF have to keep on board personnel having the earlier mentioned quality, but sooner rather than later the military leadership

must allow persons not capable of showing these qualities to leave the armed forces.

The long lasting transformation and significant downsizing process of the HHDF, which took place in the last nine or ten years will negatively influence its personnel's behavior like similar changes affected the US armed forces. „Officer behavior has been dramatically altered by downsizing. Careerism is on the rise and initiative and independence decisionmaking are in decline.”<sup>4</sup>

To avoid further development of this kind the HHDF leadership has to make every effort to get the Government and parliamentary parties to make an adequate, well-founded decision concerning future requirements for the Hungarian Home Defense.

The existing Government program can provide a good foundation for this process: „The Government hopes, on the short term (to 1999), to attain a basic level of NATO compatibility in the armed forces. In the middle term (to 2004), our hope is to increase the efficiency of the forces, and to improve the conditions of service, living, and work of those employed in them. In the long term (2010), the Government aims to reach the level of defense preparedness of an average NATO member state.”<sup>5</sup>.

The HHDF's leadership must focus on attainable efforts to contribute to the execution of the Government's objective as:

„Government will carry out a consistent and well thought-out reform of national defense and the armed forces. New basic policy principles will be put before Parliament, reacting to changed international and national defense conditions. After the acceptance of the law, the Government will create... the national security strategy and national military strategy of the Hungarian Republic.“<sup>6</sup>

Therefor the HHDF leaders have to concentrate more effort to prepare and help this decisionmaking process by encouraging research activities inside the HHDF and among civilian operated strategic institutes.

Special attention must be paid to the language training of personnel during the transformation process. At the first phase, the improvement of senior leadership's general and special military language skills must be stressed in order to establish and maintain appropriate conditions and capabilities of interoperability of Hungarian troops.

At the same time the HHDF cannot forget about the speaking and listening capabilities of younger generations. Leadership has to pay close attention and establish possibilities for the further improvement of their military language skills.

In order to fulfil the language requirements the HHDF must have a permanent, stable and developed language training insti-

tute likes today's Partnership for Peace Military Language Institute.

In the next phase of transformation, following changes of the language skills in the society, the HHDF will be able to move its main effort to the improvement of special military language capabilities of their leaders and personnel.

### **COMMAND, STAFF AND UNIT TRAINING**

In strategic, operational, and tactical training of the command level and staff according to the new structure of the HHDF, main emphasis have to be put on the implementation of basic mission. At the same time the reaction and response capabilities of command levels must be maintained. The HHDF has to pay special attention to preparation and execution of NATO oriented training of commanders and subordinates in order to reach the interoperability in the near future, and to improve its level later on.

In order to follow the changing requirements of today world and possible future challenges the HHDF General Staff must pay special attention to the preparation and training of commands, staff as well as the units nominated for participation in peacekeeping and military operations other than war.

In order to meet these requirements Hungarian commanders, staff and units have to participate in different exercises with not only our allied, but also with our neighbor armed forces. The HHDF has to create many opportunities for different military exchange programs of officers and NCOs, and military units as well.


As part of this activity the HHDF has to continue the process of common military units building with neighboring countries, and establish other units like the Romanian-Hungarian Peacekeeping Battalion, Ukrainian-Romanian-Hungarian Engineer Battalion for disaster relief, etc.

The HHDF General Staff has to adjust the requirements of unit training, according to changes in the duration of compulsory military service. It also has to take into consideration the expected increasing number of contracted soldiers in the HHDF. At the same time, it must change the structure of military preparation to provide for professional armed forces.

This must take place depending on the economic capability of Hungary, because only that kind of armed forces will be able to defend the country more effectively, in a dependable and affordable manner. American Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre characterized the US armed forces at the celebration of 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the All Volunteer Force. "This is „a” dramatically dif-

ferent military because of All Volunteer Force. It is far more „professional“, more stable.”<sup>7</sup>

In these circumstances the HHDF must keep the system of training facilities established in 1997. At the same time, their mission and equipment must be changed, actualized and modernized, and the quality of permanent personnel and training must be increased. The system of training organizations can remain the following:



**TABLE 7: ORGANIZATION OF TRAINING UNITS**

According to the official government policy, "The Government will... reduce the length of conscripted military service to six months. At the same time the training system for private soldiers and reserve troops will be reformed, and the proportion of long-service staff raised to a significantly higher level.”<sup>8</sup>

The HHDF has to adjust and improve training programs in order to meet requirements of a new personnel situation, and the lower frequency of personnel movements. The missions of training centers and their involvement into the preparation and retraining a reserve component of HHDF must also be overhauled.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

In order to fully benefit from the earlier mentioned factors, the Hungarian National Assembly, Government and HHDF have to take unavoidable, necessary steps in order to establish appropriate conditions for Hungary's defense and participation in NATO.

1. The Hungarian Government must prepare a new initiative, based on an acceptable consensus about Hungary's National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy and put it before the National Assembly for approval. To promote this process the HHDF must mobilize all available research, scientific institutions to contribute to the formulation of these important, fundamental documents.

2. The Hungarian Government has to improve the legal and institutional framework for the democratic control of the armed forces, to find or if it necessary to educate required - civilian - military specialist and put them to the right place in or-

der to control all HHDF activities.

To contribute to the democratic control, the HHDF must review and transform their Planning, Programming and Budgeting System in order to make it more open, more controllable and visible for the whole society.

3. As Hungary became a member of NATO in 1999, the HHDF must pay special attention to meet its requirements, to make the nominated units interoperable, to be ready to take part in its activity.

To assure NATO that Hungarian units will be able to effectively cooperate to allied forces, the HHDF has to take every opportunity to participate in multinational exercises, common training programs, as well as develop bilateral relations and exchange programs with other armed forces.

4. In order to operate with the armed forces of other NATO countries, the HHDF has to place emphasis on the language training of all personnel, especially the senior leadership. At the same time it does not have to forget about the language skills of officer and NCO corps. Therefor, the HHDF must keep operating, and must improve the existing language training institutions and find or establish as many opportunities as possible to increase the number of foreign language speaking personnel.

While improving our language skills, the military leadership cannot forget about studying NATO standard procedures, adjusting existing manuals to their requirements, preparing Hungarian commanders and staff in order to be ready to think, operate and conduct military business in a new way.

5. To answer the challenges posed by the new circumstances and missions, the HHDF has to transform the higher military education system, to make it less expensive, more effective, practical and more professional.

To achieve this kind of education and capabilities the system of selection must be changed, the curriculum of education institutions must be simplified, and the requirement of their staff and faculties increased.

One of the biggest challenges of the HHDF during the transformation process is the formation and preparation of a new kind of non-commissioned officer corps. A new relationship between the officer and NCO corps must be established, and the right place for NCO must be found in the existing and new training system.

In order to ensure quantity of training, readiness of troops, right balance of officer and NCO corps it is important to make more attractive the NCO's career for young people.

6. To the improve quality of people serving in the HHDF, its

leadership has to change the character of the existing personal policy. It must be more open, making it easier to join to the armed forces, and at the same time it must be easier to leave it. Quality of personnel can be improved by increasing the requirements of membership in officer or NCO corps, but at the same time achievable benefits must be improved.

7. Realizing that the most important task is homeland defense, the HHDF must be always ready with the current force structure to defend the country and prevent armed conflicts endangering it. The HHDF must always be prepared to manage emerging crisis situation like last autumn's flood, or February's big snowfall and storm, as well as to participate in peacekeeping or other kind of military operation other than war; and last but not least the HHDF must be ready to conduct defensive operation.

To accomplish these missions and keep force readiness as high as possible, special attention must be paid to preparation of every command level, to improvement of its reaction and response capability.

### **CONCLUSION**

The Cold War was characterized by a bipolar world order and global military confrontation. This went hand in glove with a high security risk and the danger of an all-out nuclear war for

both alliances. This bipolar order however had a stabilizing effect.

In contrast, the situation nowadays could be dubbed as one of low risk and low level of stability. Global military opposition has come to an end. The probability of an all-out war between European countries has decreased to a minimum.

The outstandingly important characteristic of the new situation for Hungary has been the fact that it has regained its national sovereignty and the conditions for a foreign policy based on a free choice of values have been established. In this situation Hungary bases itself on the indivisibility of security, noting that today no European state or organization can guarantee security for itself alone or to the detriment of others. We can only preserve our security in cooperation with neighboring countries and others in the region. The EU, NATO, the WEU, the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and the Council of Europe play an important role in the security of the continent. Hungary wishes to contribute to its own security and to the security and stability of Europe, carrying out the modernization of the country on the basis of membership of these institutions.

Recognition of these factors has a big influence on the Hungarian defense policy, which is built on the unity of coopera-

tion, deterrence and defense. According with these principles the most important task of the HHDF at this moment is the armed defense of the country.

While keeping the continuous readiness for the defense of the homeland, the HHDF must be transformed in order to meet the requirements of NATO membership and the changing international situation, within the financial and economic capabilities of the country.

This transformation process has to be the first step on the way of establishing a new democratically controlled, professional, highly mobile lethal force. At the end of this transformation, the HHDF must be interoperable with other highly developed armed forces, capable of defending the homeland against outside threats alone or in cooperation with allied armed forces, and become better accepted by Hungarian society.

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## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> "Hungary's Light Force Option (Force 2015)" Magyar Honved  
37: 1.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>4</sup> David McCormick, The Downsized Warrior. America's Army in Transition (New York and London: New York University Press, 1998), 146.

<sup>5</sup> "Government program for a Civic Hungary" linked from Welcome to the Prime Minister's Office, available from <<http://www.meh.hu>>; Internet; accessed 15 Sept 1998.

<sup>6</sup> "Government program for a Civic Hungary" linked from Welcome to the Prime Minister's Office, available from <<http://www.meh.hu>>; Internet; accessed 15 Sept 1998.

<sup>7</sup> "DoD Celebrates 25 Years of the All Volunteer Force" linked from JCSTLink, available from <<http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/index.html>>; Internet; accessed 03 Jan 1999.

<sup>8</sup> "Government program for a Civic Hungary" linked from Welcome to the Prime Minister's Office, available from <<http://www.meh.hu>>; Internet; accessed 15 Sept 1998.



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